More on the Break-In and Internal Controls

Given my interest in the area of internal controls, I'm watching the story I posted last week on the break-in into Rabbi Shteiman's home with a mix of curiousity and passion. It seems to me (one [wo]man's opinion) that this crime should be easily solvable. If this report is accurate, the police know that someone had a key to the apartment and one to the cash drawer. Either full information is not being offered up to the police, or internal controls were so weak that the askanim simply don't have a clue who has copies of keys and how many times keys have been duplicated throughout the years. My inkling is the former, although I wouldn't discount the latter.

In terms of the latter, how many of our schools and shuls have keys/security codes that are known to nearly all shul members, students, etc? This is a policy that should be reconsidered. I imagine that if I returned to a former residence, I would still be able to punch my way right into a certain building. Of course, there are other institutions that don't always lock the doors.

As per the newest report regarding the break in at Rav Shteinman's home, a safe has been installed amongst other security measures. I don't know if a safe is sufficient for an organization that deals with $50K in cash at any one point. I do know that a safe that isn't behind secure doors can be picked up and carted off.

Hopefully this incident will serve as a call to shuls, schools, and tzedakah organizations to take a look at their internal controls, seek professional advice, and make changes were needed. A good place to start would be changing the key codes in many an institution. If the entire student body or most of a kehillah knows the code, you have a security issue.